Badiou’s Politics, Nihilism, and a Solution!

As I have my MA thesis defence next week, I thought it would be good to post a short outline of what I discuss therein. Of course, along the way, I develop a Badiouian theory of historical change, a humanist anthropology that demarcates the political sphere from others, and all kinds of other lines of inquiry. Here is just the main idea that inspired the thesis from the start. This will be old hat for those who’ve attended my talks on this topic.

For Badiou, what is, strictly speaking, is a multiplicity of multiplicities, cashed out in terms of set theory. There are sets within sets within sets, all the way, with one exception: the null set, or the void. Every well-founded set contains the empty set as an element. The situations in which we exist are this sort of set. So, in every socio-historical situation, there will be some part (sub-set) whose elements do not belong to the situation. This is the void of the situation, much like the null-set element in any founded set.

Badiou has a famous conception of the “event”, as a rupture with the situation. This rupture or break from the structure of this situation out of which it arises can occur because of this part that escapes the count/structure of the situation. Since there is a kind of “outside” within each situation, there is a latent possibility of an event. When something happens on the edge of the void, someone or ones (political subjectivity is/can be collective) may be hailed to decide upon the significance of the event. When a protest erupts, seemingly out of nowhere, a witness, either within or without, must “decide” upon the significance of the event.

This decision is either an interpretation according to the means of understanding available from within the situation, in which case it will not have been an event; or, the decision will be a declaration without concept of the evental significance of the happening. The former might be to think or say, “this is just another protest like all the rest.” The latter would be to give the happening a name, and commit oneself to tracing out the consequences of its truth in and through making true this declaration.

A potential political actor has two options for genuine political engagement: either one happens across what will have been an event in the making, or one enters into an already open procedure of truth (the procedure of tracing out the consequences of the evental decision). But, since Badiou’s presentation seems to intentionally lead the reader to believe that events are incredibly rare, his examples number five in over two hundred years, there are few opportunities for engagement of the first sort. This leaves the possibility of entering into an already open procedure of truth, which is equally unlikely for some, especially young, potential political actors.

Let Us Think: Reading "First as Tragedy, Then as Farce"

This is an old post (Nov 2009) of mine from a different blog, but I like the passage so much I thought I would share it again.

Zizek's most recent effort is welcomed by this peripatetic with open arms and eyes glued to the pages as I bump into strangers all over campus. Our dear old Slovenian wordsmith has always had a knack for grabbing and holding the reader's attention, only with this effort, as with his earlier writings, when I stop reading, I can recall and explain the point of what I just read. No, Zizek hasn't stopped theorizing through innumerable examples and rhetorical flourishes that some of us find distracting, albeit entertaining. 

In First as Tragedy, then as Farce, Zizek uses his familiar methods to discuss and deliver his message in all of the detail and nuance they deserve. This takes considerable effort, and many, many examples to think through. Only, in this work, all of the twists and turns seem to help his cause. Instead of talking continuously so as not to cease existing - a worry he expresses in Astra Taylor's film Zizek! - he seems genuinely impassioned. For someone wandering around the left wing with a vague sense that something needs to be done, having his genius directed toward something he seems to care so much about should prove useful, if not comforting.

For my money, and I'm not finished reading (only 20-ish pages to go!), the value of First as Tragedy for political thinking lies both in the general message that Zizek is laying out, and in the many analyses of our present situation that he offers. I want to comment only on the former at this time. His program is distinctly Communist in character, but not a naive return to a critique of the contradictions of our historical situation - which is not to say that such a critique cannot be performed.

Instead, Zizek highlights the imperative to think through the idea of Communism, an idea we must hold onto in the face of a hollowed out Democracy that applies to any and all situations. Communism, as an idea, is itself something we have to make sense of in light of our current historical situation, and not something we apply to the situation in order to make sense of the latter. The failing of the left is that even in a world where the whole political spectrum knows that something is wrong, the left, the alternative, has no clear picture of what to do in place of the status quo.

This diagnosis leaves us in a position where we want to act (that is, some of you want to act), but don't know what to do. By default, the liberal hegemony continues. This is why Zizek offers my favorite of his recent injunctions: we need to stop and think.

With incredible frequency, Politicians deliver promises that are never fulfilled through action. Granted. But, on the contrary, those politicians also act all too often without thinking. The current financial crisis is the result of something, yet instead of figuring out what and why, the governments of the global powers act - perhaps in response the their jerking knees - by throwing $700 Billion (in the US alone) at the problem, as though this will save the sinking ship.

Likewise, activists of all stripes gather in futile efforts that serve their egos and self-images more than any 'cause' which they feign to represent. Perhaps this may be overly cynical, but those activists, those young people, do little more than practice being political, even when they have good intensions. My wager is that this is because they have a confused mix of tired messages and newly born angst, but little if any thought (maybe they are lacking a procedure of truth?) guiding their efforts.

Zizek reminds us that in lieu of a well thought out program of action, and in lieu of an alternative vision of life to the one that "ended history", we ought to slow down, regroup, figure out what it means to be the left, the communists, of today, and then proceed. As a philosopher, this injunction to think is the sweetest music I've heard in a while. I'd like to suggest that we need to think about what kind of event could, and what it would mean for that event to, symbolically 'un-end' history.

Reflections on Philosophy

I will be posting a series of interviews I am conducting rather informally with some graduate students of philosophy. I'm mostly interested in having a kind of reflective discussion about philosophy as a practice and how we see our jobs, motivations, goals, communities and so on.

A lot is taken for granted in this regard, and I think it will be useful to make explicit and discuss what we do in this field. I'm not sure exactly what we will get out of this, but I hope it is a way-in to further discussions about philosophy in general, and maybe even some discussions that are specifically philosophical in nature. 

I am conducting the interviews by e-mail and somewhat concurrently, so I will post them in the order that I complete them.

Addendum: I should add that if anyone else wants to be so interviewed, e-mail me and we can discuss it: major.philosophy[at]gmail.com

Let's Not be Too Hasty...

...it is after all a time honored tradition!

From the New York Times (excerpts):

BEIJING — The Chinese government has called for an end to the public shaming of criminal suspects, a time-honored cudgel of Chinese law enforcement but one that has increasingly rattled the public.

The new regulations are thought to be a response to the public outcry over a recent spate of “shame parades,” in which those suspected of being prostitutes are shackled and forced to walk in public.

Last October, the police in Henan Province took to the Internet, posting photographs of women suspected of being prostitutes. Other cities have taken to publishing the names and addresses of convicted sex workers and those of their clients. The most widely circulated images, taken earlier this month in the southern city of Dongguan, included young women roped together and paraded barefoot through crowded city streets.

The police later said they were not punishing the women, only seeking their help in the pursuit of an investigation.

Public shaming of the accused and the condemned has been a long tradition in China — one that the Communist Party embraced with zeal during episodes of class struggle and anticrime crusades. Although public executions have been discontinued, provincial cities still hold mass sentencing rallies, during which convicts wearing confessional placards are driven though the streets in open trucks.

Too Anarchist, or Not Too Anarchist?

This is an old post (Nov 2009) of mine from a different blog, but I like the passage so much I thought I would share it again. It was pretty popular with at least one reader. (I added some schnazzy pics to spice it up.)

In my current theoretical space, I am a Badiouian (and for some reason this particular adjectival form makes me smile each time I say, er, type it). As such, I ought to be open, in some sense, to the idea of “spontaneous self-organization”, which is the preferred form of organization by many in the left today. This organizational method or practice is overtly anarchistic and seems to be the main alternative to the old ideas about grassroots organizing, building committees of resistance that intervene locally but share an ideology and sense of purpose with other local bodies, eventually linking up or coming together under one party banner – a unified front – to take their interventions to the big stage, and so on.

I suggest that I ought to find this idea of spontaneous self-organization appealing, since, for Badiou, and according to my modified Badiouian political framework, politics is inaugurated in an aleatory event. We cannot predict or force an event, so, in some sense, we organize in and through our becoming subject to the new procedure of truth. Our coming together into a collective subjectivity in response to an unpredictable event sounds a lot like spontaneous self-organization. Our fidelity compels us to materially trace out the consequences of our commitment, that is, in the good old-fashioned Marxist, (Hegelian even) sense of getting your hands dirty and changing the world according to your will – or in this case, according to the truth you’ve wagered on. This seems like something that those who favor the idea of spontaneous self-organization would like: become political when you are struck by something important that calls for engagement. Engage in ways that make sense to you, indifferent to there being a movement or front. The picture all kind of comes together.

Why then do I not find this idea about organization appealing? Well, I just don’t see it as something I can have confidence in. It seems to me that global capitalism, or whatever name we might give to “the system”, is going to have to change. For many reasons – take your pick – the system will be forced to transform radically. This is somewhat contentious; but, taking it for granted, we have the choice to let forces other than our own efforts steer the change, or we can change it according to our will. Perhaps this is my call to action or something.

If you experience, morally, existentially, or otherwise, the imperative to act in the face of this supposed change, then you need ask yourself: can I rely upon spontaneous self-organization of the left to steer the transformation? I’d not bet on it. It seems to me a matter of confidence that the left work hard to find ways of organizing that allow some measure of control, and that allows political actors to gauge the discontent of the masses, the effects of disaster ideologies on people – that is, how effective are the enemies at hijacking public opinion? (and how effective are we at it for that matter?) – and an organization that allows strong and strategic intervention. Of course, if individuals or groups spontaneously act in solidarity with the organized movement or front, then all the better, it just seems to me that the masses will need a sympathetic nudge.

I suppose the point, in a round about way, is that confidence plays an important role in the evaluation of political theories, and I have more confidence in something like Lenin’s vanguardism than the many versions of anarchism circulating today. Works like The Coming Insurrection, by the Invisible Committee, just don’t inspire confidence (although I welcome suggestions about other anarchisms that might do so).

Against Modesty, or "Why is Careerism Such a Dirty Word?"

First, I'm obviously not against modesty in any absolute sense. What I am against is the idea that those in the academy ought to be apologetic for their successes and the things they know, and how some very successful, very keen thinkers manage to travel the halls of their institutions without their students knowing just how big they are.

One of the best things that grad students can do is to model the behaviour of professors who they find interesting, productive, kind, supportive and so on. Figure out how those you look up to do it, and take advantage of the things they've learned through their own sweat and tears. Everyone with jobs in the academy are intelligent people. But some are exceptionally so, and some are exceptionally well-organized, disciplined, and so on. Some thinkers leave their mark on a field and cast a long shadow. These people have secrets that others don't. If they are too modest, then many students miss out on the chance to pick their brains.

Now, people will respond that students shouldn't merely go star gazing. The less popular, but still highly intelligent professors of the academy still have much to offer, and possibly more since their time is likely more their own. Success brings a lot of responsibility in terms of speaking engagements, books, articles, and so on. Some big shots are lousy supervisors. But some aren't! Those modest giants who seamlessly navigate the corridors of their schools, blending into the masses, are likely also ones who seem kind, supportive and so on. Combine that with their place in their field, and you have on your hands a great learning opportunity.

So professors, if you are hot shots, don't keep it to yourself. Be a hot shot, and show me the ropes!

I guess this goes for grad students as well. I hate the denigration that gets heaped upon ambitious students who work hard and produce presentable, publishable, works. We need more, not fewer, of these students. What we need less of are arrogant, vicious, and unsupportive students, as well as those who suck the energy from those who want to better themselves and their skills. There is a negative force at two poles: both those with too many excuses for their own ineptitude, who try to drag others down; and, those successful students who have the attitude that if you aren't on their level just now, then you are a loser.

I'd like to see more students taking seriously the careerist aspects of graduate school, while maintaining a positive, helpful, and cooperative attitude toward their peers. Seeing your name in print is a shot in the arm, which is well-deserved for surviving all the times you get rejected before you get there. Also, writing is what we do. Our ideas, as well-formed as they seem in our minds, are never as well-formed as they will be when we write them down to present to a public. We think through our writing, so more writing, is, in principle, more thinking. As a philosopher, this is a good thing.

One thing that I've come to realize is that writing begets writing. The more you give talks, publish papers, workshop, and so on, the more opportunities to do these things you will have. You make many connections in and through the activities that are a normal part of our jobs anyway. Someone will overhear the brilliant presentation you gave based on your thesis - work you have already put in - and invite you to write a chapter for their book. This really happens, and it's how some people manage to get so many publications. Journals accept an incredibly low percent of submissions (5-10%), so you will get rejected many more times than accepted. If you get invited to write or talk, then you circumvent that whole process. The lesson: write more, present more, so you can write more and present more and thus THINK more too.

I strive to achieve both the kind of attitude toward my peers that I described above and toward my work, though I am not particularly successful myself. Some of the things I do, that you can too, to be a better colleague are: make your work available to others, give them honest advice based on your own trials and pitfalls, and take their projects seriously when they have something serious to share. Build a community and you will reap the rewards.

Onticology: Some notes about objects

As mentioned previously, I'm reading through a draft manuscript of Levi Bryant's forthcoming

The Democracy of Objects. A little over fifty pages in, and I'm really enjoying the clarity of this text. For those of you interested in SR/OOO, there is almost too much information in the blogosphere to keep up with. To be sure, this is a good thing. If you want to follow up on these points or flesh out your own understanding, the best resource is the Speculative Realism Pathfinder. I encourage you to take a look, as this emerging field seems to be drawing people into its orbit at such a rate that it will surely take hold as more than a fad. In fact, established field have been incorporated into this broad area retroactively. Both actor-network theory and eliminative materialism are considered to fall under the umbrella of speculative realism.

At the heart of onticology, Bryant's particular version of object-oriented ontology, is a peculiar conception of objects. In some sense, the object takes the place of "substance" in classical metaphysics. I'll outline a few points about objects to give you a sense for what he thinks of them.

• Objects are not defined by their qualities (or occasions thereof, termed "events"), but by their "powers" or capacities. So, an object can be without it's qualities, but not without its powers.

• Likewise (for reasons too complicated to get into here, and to save something of the secret for those who get the book), objects are not defined by their external relations.

• Object relations come in two forms, internal or "endo-" and external or "exo-". The former comprise the structure of an object (much more will be said of this in the coming chapters me thinks), and the latter the relations objects enter into with other objects.

• Since objects have the power to created events in the world (keep in mind the notion of event mentioned above), objects apart from their qualities are called "difference engines", insofar as the production of an event makes a difference in the world. This looks like a trace of what used to be a central principle for Bryant, namely "the ontic principle", that he has since dropped: there is no difference that does not make a difference (which implied that objects were, in some sense, the difference they made in the world).

• He also introduces a very cool-sounding bit of terminology, that I'm not sure is necessary: "virtual proper being". Objects are not their qualities, yet they endure, the substantial portion (object apart from quality) is called virtual proper being. I here the word "monad" ringing somewhere in the distance here, if ever so softly. I'm looking forward to more on this concept.

• The term "quality" is dropped (though event is still maintained as synonym) in favor of "Local Manifestation". Events occur in a number of ways, always under particular conditions. So each event is a local manifestation. There is a cautionary note, however. Manifestations are not manifest to any subject. Instead they are "actualizations" in the world, witnessing subject or no.

• Since objects are at the core difference engines, whose qualities are events or manifestations, we should not say that the object "has" qualities, but rather "does" qualities.

• The picture of objects we are left with, where the core object and it's manifestations/qualities are separate but connected in some kind of endo-relation, is one of a split-object. The "core" or virtual proper being of an object is always, in some sense, withdrawn (to borrow the term from Graham Harman) behind its qualities, and thus withdrawn from other objects.

More to come as I read more from Bryant, but also from others in this field. On the suggestion of Graham Harman, I will be reading some Leibniz to better ground my understanding of classical metaphysics. That should make for a couple interesting posts!

Kant, and Fun with Counterfactual Hypotheticals

This is an old post (Dec 2009) of mine from a different blog, but I like the passage so much I thought I would share it again. If anyone reads this, maybe you will have a more interesting way to interpret it?

This excerpt is from a strange little section of Kant's Second Critique called "On the Wise Adaptation of the Human Being’s Cognitive Faculties to His Practical Vocation". He is imagining what it would be like if could somehow peer into the noumenal realm:

Instead of the conflict that the moral disposition now has to carry on with the inclinations, in which, through after some defeats, moral strength of soul is to be gradually acquired, God and eternity with their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes…[H]ence most actions conforming to the law would be done from fear, only a few from hope, and none at all from duty, and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the world depends, would not exist at all. As long as human nature remains as it is, human conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism in which, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but there would be no life in the figures.

The phenomenal realm is law-governed, and, as such, our freedom is not found in this realm. If we could see into the noumenal (which we can't), there too we would not find the locus of our freedom. Instead, Zizek suggests that the interplay between the two is where our freedom is operative. I prefer to see the noumenal as the "Real" void of the phenomenal, an excess. Since moral worthiness is a matter of determining the will according to duty for duty's sake instead of determining the will according to inclination, something must account for this choice, and the freedom to make this choice ex nihilo. Since the noumenal realm, and god and the afterlife for that matter, is a necessary thought without positive (perhaps very minimal) content, then why not locate spontaneous freedom to self-determine the will on the side of the noumenal -- again as a necessary thought -- rather than the interplay Zizek prefers? I don't see what is gained from Zizek's take, other than that it fits nicely with his "parallax".

Reading Kant makes me happy.

I also added this gem to the comments on that blog post:

While we're talking Kant... I recall reading this joke from Kant's third Critique. (I grabbed it from wiki this time.) He says, "Laughter is an effect that arises if a tense expectation is transformed into nothing." Here is Kant's 219-year old joke and his analysis:

An Englishman at an Indian's table in Surat saw a bottle of ale being opened, and all the beer, turned to froth, rushed out. The Indian, by repeated exclamations, showed his great amazement. - Well, what's so amazing in that? asked the Englishman. - Oh, but I'm not amazed at its coming out, replied the Indian, but how you managed to get it all in. - This makes us laugh, and it gives us a hearty pleasure. This is not because, say, we think we are smarter than this ignorant man, nor are we laughing at anything else here that it is our liking and that we noticed through our understanding. It is rather that we had a tense expectation that suddenly vanished...

Kant really does make me happy!

Speculative Realism (SR) and Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO)

For those of you who know me, you'll know that I've had a spectator's interests in SR/OOO for some time. I've read Quentin Meillasoux's After Finitude, an excellent promissory text, where the central problematic of this field is defined (though a solution or alternative is only hinted at). I've also, obviously, read a small bit of Graham Harman's work in both Tool-Being and Guerilla Metaphysics. Harman's philosophy is built upon an extensive analysis of Heidegger's analysis of tools and the shift that takes place when they break down. From what I can tell, both of Harman's texts are of the highest quality, though Heideggerians are likely to get pissed off if they read him.

The other major coordinates of this emerging field are Iain Hamilton Grant, whose work I am wholly unfamiliar with (as I think there isn't all that much of it available) and Ray Brassier, whose text Nihil Unbound looks very interesting from what I have skimmed (it's something of a fundamentally nihilist scientism?). Apparently Brassier has a discussion of Badiou in there, though I didn't come across it myself. All of the main "coordinates" of this field, as I call them, are kinds of ontological realists (the position that we can know about objects as they exist independently of all traces of the human, and not a thesis about how we can know objects). I will come back to this.

There are, of course, other thinkers who've been very influential on this field either directly, in the case of Badiou on Meillasoux (the latter was a student of the former) and Latour on Harman, or indirectly in the case of Whitehead, the Ancients and Early-Moderns on everyone.

I would contend, from what I know of SR/OOO, that there is a fifth major coordinate to this field, though he is a little known philosopher - if a very well known blogger (to many hip continental leaning graduate students): Levi Bryant. He is the source of the term "Object-Oriented Ontology", and calls his own ontology "onticology". His version of OOO is what he calls a "flat ontology" in that:

there are [not] two worlds, the real natural world and the ideal mental world of meaning, but that there is only one level: reality. Onticology thus draws a transversal line across the distinction between mind and world, culture and nature. Culture is not other than reality or the real, but is an element of the real. Since onticology begins with the hypothesis, wishing to know where it will go, that there is no difference that does not make a difference, it proves impossible to exclude the human. Why? Because humans make a difference. What onticology objects to is not the thesis that humans are elements in the real, but the thesis that every relation is a human-world relation.

How badass does that sound? I'll tell you what, I've started reading the unpublished manuscript of his forthcoming The Democracy of Objects, and it is still just as intriguing.

The central problematic for all of the Speculative Realists is the problem of "correlationism" outlined by Meillasoux. He says,

by 'correlation' we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never either term considered apart from the other.

Perhaps the problem isn't as obvious as it would seem. Their concern is not strictly with mind/world relations. It is more general and pervasive. The problem is that all of our thinking of Being is thinking Being sutured to something of the human subject, whether is be mind, language, culture, or what have you. Further, the correlationist need not be an idealist. They don't deny the existence of a world apart from human subjectivity and all its traces. They simply think we cannot know things in themselves, and thus they turn every effort to know objects into a study of the study of objects (that is, a study of objects conditioned by human subjectivity). Shame on them!

Bryant draws on Foucault's concept of the 'episteme' to describe the bias away from ontology and toward epistemology that I often rant about. I've often said that everyone today begins with the epistemological question, in one form or another, ignoring the ontological. This is because correlationism has become a kind of "historical a priori" that defines the space in which we do philosophy. The realm in which we can disagree about anything is defined by certain things we must share in common, and take for granted. The Speculative Realists argue (convincingly) that this is a correlationist time and place.

Instead of thinking the being of objects sutured to human access, can we think the being of objects as such? These strange realists think so. I will post more about this as I read on.

Experiments in Ontology: Baudrillard and Hyperreality

One of Baudrillard’s key insights is that upon radicalization, every theory (or system) is subject to the form of reversibility. He is speaking specifically about systems of signification, but following the sentiments of his own methodology – that we take ideas to their extremes – can we not extend his notion of reversibility to other kinds of systems?

The idea is that taken to the extreme, any theory or system will fold back on itself. An interesting way to read the concept ‘hyperreality’ is as a kind of reversal from simulation to reality. A simulation is a copy of some real. As simulation reaches totality, as it covers over the real completely, there is nothing left but simulation. Simulation no longer has a basis in some real. With no remaining reality to support the simulation, it is completely detached, orbital, or ‘sovereign’. As the only “stuff” left, simulation becomes the “stuff” of reality, or reality itself. The system of simulation thus reverses itself at the limit point: what was a simulation of some real is now the real itself, the new real. Can we read this phenomenon more radically than does Baudrillard himself?

Sociologists, tired of the infectivity of language games, are trying to extend the use of postmodern theory into the realm of empirical research. Mirchandani (Sociological Theory, 23:1, 2005) and Cole, for example, think that Baudrillard and his postmodern colleagues have insights to offer that can shape the way we study the world around us. Might thinkers like Baudrillard also help us to think about the nature of reality as such? Over the next little while I’ll be working on outlining the contours of Baudrillard’s postmodernist epistemological ideas in order to then see how we might be able to apply something gleaned to our thinking about ontology: perhaps a sort of postmodern ontology. I guess the speculation would be that maybe Being as such is itself subject to instability, change, and ultimately a kind of structural reversal of the sort intended by the concept “hyperreality”. (Yes, Heideggerians, I probably have made an entity out of Being.) More on this point is sure to follow.

While on the topic of hyperreality: In Simulacra and Simulation, Baudrillard begins with a discussion of Borges’ fable of the map (“On Exactitude in Science”). The fable has it that a master cartographer creates a map of the land on a 1-to-1 scale, perfectly reproducing the land it maps. It is not exactly clear how we are to understand the fable in Baudrillard’s discussion of it. He says both that the map, as simulacrum, precedes the real land it maps; and, that the real does not survive its being covered over by the map. As usual, this is no matter of concern for us here. I think it is an interesting metaphor for the kind of ontology that might be suggested by the notion of hyperreality. The land covered over by the map will die and decay, and eventually become desert, so that the only real thing left is the map. Likewise, could it be that as simulation completes itself and covers over the real, the real doesn’t survive its total simulation and instead dies out, leaving only the simulation in its place?

If this has happened, if we live in hyperreality, could it be that to be is to be simulation? And if this is the case, post-reversal, would it matter? And would it any longer make sense to call our real a simulation?

The Conservatism of Protest Ideology

I had originally written up a much longer post about the recent G20 “crisis” in Toronto. Instead I’ll give you the most interesting point, and cut the chaff. There are two aspects to what I find interesting about the outrage people express toward the G20 security response. One aspect is that many innocent people were arrested and detained. Most of this sort of dimension of the problem rests on something like “punishment doesn’t fit the crime” logic. Fair enough in many cases. Though I think most people got "cool" war-stories out of it and suffered very little to get them. No matter, I will leave that issue for the time being. The other dimension of the outrage is something much less obvious.

People are very concerned with the ways in which their civil liberties have been compromised. The security force was either allowed to operate outside the law or to write the law on the fly. This flies in the face of juridico-legislative due process. The way the security response worked to shut down the protest denied many (approx. 900) their “right to protest”. It is around the loss of this right that there is so much fervor. But what is this right really? This sacred right to protest is all smoke and mirrors. Of course the police state will never wholly deny the right to protest, they want you to protest.

There is a common, and really quite genius, strategy of sterilizing threats by integrating them into the systems that they are designed to unsettle. I’ve recently been told that Noam Chomsky makes frequent reference to this phenomenon. MIT, an otherwise quite conservative institution, allows him to work there with all his radical leftist propaganda. They can’t really be that opposed to his politics if they allow him to give voice to his positions in their institution, can they? Well, his point is that one of the best ways to take the subversive edge off something like this, is to allow it, give it a home, and to do so in ways that are acceptable to the system. The police state allows protest because it is an ineffective and generally apolitical way to blow off steam without threatening real change.

For all those worried about your sacred right to protest, don’t be. It’s yours for as long as you want it. Of course, in order for the game to function, the police response has to be there. You have to feel like you are combating some oppressive regime for you to have the proper experience. This is as ideological as it comes. The police say, “no don’t protest, we’ll lock you up…lousy youth. Learn some manners, and pull up your pants!” This creates the space in which young people can feel political without being political.

Genuine politics doesn’t operate under the condition of being granted the right. It is never the case that the-powers-that-be give you the means (at least not on purpose) to compromise their power. You take it. You declare your right to effect change, and proceed according to your right. You act in such a way that the situation changes according to the right that directs your political intervention. The whole worry about them taking our right to protest away misses the entire point, which is exactly what prevents any really politics from taking place.

Zizek gives an excellent and very accessible discussion of ideology that I think may be helpful for interpreting the G20 and its aftermath. (His point about the “self-mockery” of pornography [35 min in] is exactly the kind of play I had suggested goes on in much of the cheesy MTV programming, though I didn’t really say anything about censorship in and through this play.)

A few final notes about politics:

I don’t have perfectly clear theory of political change, but I do have certain intuitions. Some of which (I had originally planned to discuss) are:

1) Politics operates at a distance from the state. You don’t effect radical change by following the rules.

2) Insofar as it is political, it must be radically so. Politics is not a negotiation of interests, but the bringing into being of a radically new structure/situation.

3) Spontaneous organization is a pipe dream. The new anarchisms that envision a cooperative but anarchically coordinated mass movement is about as passive as awaiting the second coming, and a kind of bad faith excuse. Radical politics must be undertaken by a subjectivity at least loosely organized around some kind of centre. My speculation is that this has to be some kind of charismatic leadership.

4) Radical change must occur in response to a kind of break or gap in the structure/logic of the situation. Also, although we cannot simply will into being a political event, we can exploit openings when they are presented. The degree to which we can create openings is still somewhat fuzzy to me. This is a point very much worth exploring.

I suppose this all makes me some kind of revolutionary vanguardist. So be it. I don’t see another way to bring about the kind of break necessary for real change. As suggested, I haven’t a very clear or detailed political program, but these are my intuitions about politics. If you see a lot of Badiou in these points, it is because I’ve been submerged in his works for well over a year. As I go forward with other thinkers, I will continue to flush out these insights.

Real or Fake?

One of the fascinating things we can take from one of my favorite philosophers Jean Baudrillard is that the real is never pure, and it seems to me that the simulation isn’t either. Of course Baudrillard thinks – one of his more adventurous methodological challenges – that we should take ideas, systems, and simulations to their logical extremes to see what we learn. I take up this challenge by casting theories of ideology as ontological questions instead of epistemological ones, especially with respect to Baudrillard’s concept “hyperreality”. No matter here.

We find a particularly apt example of how neither reality nor its simulation is pure when we examine reality television. It is widely understood that reality television is tremendously scripted, produced, and contrived. An example of an interesting ideological play on this idea comes from MTV in the form of stupid shows like “Parental Control” and “Disaster Date” (don’t ask how I know). These particularly idiotic (but addictive) programs are so phony that the audience knows that the show is put on. There is a kind of air about these shows that seems to indicate that the producers of the shows know that the audience know that the shows are anything but “real”. This exemplifies the evacuation of the term itself.

Recently, we find an even more interesting case with an extra reversal. Usually reality television is a simulation of reality presented as real. In the case of the finale of “The Hills” (I know, shut up), there is a further reversal that puts into question both the nature of simulation and that of reality and our ability to discern the two. After a long tearful goodbye between Brody and Kristen against the backdrop of the Hollywood hills, she drives off leaving a sad and contemplative man behind. But, in a brilliantly ridiculous bit of “cinematography”, the camera pans out where we see the screen behind Brody wheeled off and Kristen in a car not but a few feet away. The producers of the show reveal the “truth” that The Hills is not in fact “real”.

The lower orders of simulation are simple reproductions of objects. A painting or photograph of a real tree. Higher orders, the stuff of hyperreality, are simulations without a real object to simulate. Some examples are the film “The China Syndrome” where there is a nuclear reactor meltdown (coincidently, just) before any real reactor actually melts down. The simulation preceded the real in this case. Another notable example of the hyperreal is pornography. Certain sexual acts transpire in a way that is supposed to be an example of what some real, some cool and sexy, people actually do. But, there are certain mainstream pornographic scenes that are copies without a basis in any particular “real”. It’s not hard to think of examples of certain uncomfortable features that no (very few) women are anatomically equipped to enjoy.

The Hills’ finale makes us think: as reality tv, we knew it was fake all along. But, then we find out it’s fake. Is the operation of revealing the ruse a “real” revealing? What would it mean for this to be a “real fake”. What happens to the status of the real/simulation binary when we undertake these many reversals? In all honesty, I’m not sure what to make of this. Ought we make sense of this in the same terms we would any other “real”, “fake”, or “reality tv” program? Or is this indicative of something more radical? Might this reveal to us what has already been the case: namely, that the distinction between real and simulation is already fuzzy? If the distinction breaks down, that is, if we lose grip of the discernability of this distinction, then we are in a state of hyperreality, and perhaps we don’t have to imagine what it would be like by taking an idea about ideology to the extreme. Perhaps we live in that extreme.

Advice

For those students who haven't come across Graham Harman's blog, stop reading this and go look at his posts filed under "advice". I'm somewhat interested in the Speculative Realism and Object-Oriented Ontology movements in "post-continental" philosophy these days, so I've had philosophical reasons to follow Harman. His analysis of Heidegger's "Tool-Being" in Being and Time is excellent, and the conclusions he draws from it incredibly creative. But what I've come to appreciate most about his blog are not his philosophical musings, or the details about whatever random thing is happening in his life or interests. Rather, what keeps me coming back are his advice posts aimed at young academics. I find them both inspiring and comforting. I don't always agree with the things he says, but they always feel a bit like a pat on the back.

As I re-read his newly posted "old posts" (which were lost in switching from one version of his blog to another version of it), I am coming across many of his advice posts, and will inevitably post some of my favorite insights as I go. One that I came across just now that I particularly like has to do with when we have "theoretical reversals". There are times where we make a 180 degree turn with respect to some key feature of a theory we endorse. Besides all the other interesting things he has to say about them, I particularly like the idea that "It often takes 'calendar time' to bring them about rather than 'work time.' You need time to become bored with a theory before it’s easy to see the holes in it." I've been working on one project for well over a year now, and only in becoming bored with it have I been able to begin questioning much of what I had taken for granted all along.

We all get swept up in new and exciting ideas. This is one of the most enjoyable times to be a philosopher. But, it seems to me that during the euphoria of having these sorts of really exciting new opportunities for thought may not be the best time to be overly critical of them, nor to expect yourself to be. You will inevitably be somewhat blinded, which is perhaps a sort of enabling condition that allows us to put in the work that is required to learn something new. Roll with the new thing, see where it takes you. There will come a time down the road where the passion turns to sober consideration. This is the time to really make your lasting evaluations. I think it is also during these times when one ought to reevaluate their allegiances in general.

I've always been particularly interested in theories of ideology. Through investigating these interests, I've branched into psychoanalysis, political theory, and much of what I work on today, especially Badiou and Zizek. But having come to the end of my current project on Badiou, I'm finding that I am no longer certain that Badiou has the answer to the problem I thought he did in the beginning, and I am again feeling the need to re-engage with my lasting interests. This is not to say that I don't support Badiou on many points, or that my interest in him will not last. But in this post-excitement period, I am getting a renewed sense for what is really important to me in philosophy.

We often think that we need theoretical or "work" distance in order to be able to be critical of our own ideas. I think this is true. But, it is also true that we need "time" distance, or distance from the initial period of fervor to see where we really stand. I'm going to try to keep this in mind and allow myself the giddiness I feel when I take on something new, leaving the self-examination for later.

Origin Stories

I suppose the first post on a new blog is always somewhat awkward. With no audience and no inertia, I face what Graham Harman calls the worst enemies of a writer: zero and infinity. Lucky me, however, as I have something to say right out of the gates. Instead of discussing the beginning of a blog, I'd rather share some thoughts about the beginnings of philosophy. I'm not so much interested in the pre-socratics or the 'Greek Miracle', as I am in something that I've actually had some trouble articulating.

It seems to me that what I've wanted to explore are two thoughts: first, how is it that one becomes who they are as a philosopher? How does one find their voice, or view, or lense, etc? In other words, before Heidegger was Heidegger he was just another reader of philosophy. At what point did he become "Heidegger" the philosopher. Throughout a productive and interesting, albeit "colorful", career, Heidegger was always Heidegger. Before and after "the turn", he would still take the same general approach to whatever random problem you put before him. You can say the same of Derrida, Badiou, or whichever other major figure of philosophy. No, I don't think this is exclusively a characteristic of the famous thinkers as it is entirely likely that many unknowns have a distinct philosophical perspective and actually have ideas. It is this last point that I think most crucial.

It seems to me that great ideas do not happen by accident. It is true that ideas come to us in ways that we cannot account for, but the really great ideas don't just pop into the minds of the fortunate. Rather, it is my wager that it is earned, and a consequence of deliberate effort. Well organized thought patterns, hard work, trial and error, and a sense of adventure are necessary (perhaps not sufficient) for one to have great ideas (maybe, as Heidegger says, "one great idea"). A part of this wager is that I think that one has to have the subjective shift from one who likes philosophy, who would like to have a good idea, to one who believes that they can have a great idea. One has to believe that they can have something to say before they actually have something to say, or they'll never find what it is that would take them from Phil Major the student of philosophy to "Phil Major" the philosopher.

The second thought I've been kicking around with respect to origins has to do with how to proceed? If one comes to the maturity of a philosophy who can have a great idea, how is it that one should begin? Of course this whole line of questioning is open to the deconstructionist point (a valid one) that whatever I declare as my first step will actually be the next step in a line that has always already begun. Fair point. What I mean to say is that if we can take deliberate measures to achieve a well-reasoned, original, and lasting perspective, stance or system, how is it that I can go from one who has already begun their journey, so to speak, to one who is beginning their journey as mature philosopher in earnest? I will try to give some more detail to the kind of suggestion I have in this regard in a coming post. For now, it seems to me that a good first question to ask is "what is really important to me?" What blows your hair back? What sorts of things do you keep coming back to? Identify what is already there to work with and then examine it. Really give it the full treatment and see what assumptions are weak or unfounded, what needs to be in place to make sense of your intuitions and convince others?

This may seem like an obvious point, but it looks to me like many (myself included) proceed in a haphazard manner that doesn't seem to lead anywhere in particular. This may be a great way to discover new things and cover terrain unseen from a more rigid approach, but it falls victim to a kind of ironic stagnancy. I'd like to both learn new things, things beyond my desired trajectory, but also have a trajectory. I'll try to balance both and move forward, in part by writing here.