Reflections on Philosophy: Ben Woodard Interview

I truly hope that philosophy is not focused on humans, or on learning only for ourselves or more about ourselves at the expense of the massive swirling world around us. If this is the case then philosophy is too much like folk psychology and the self help industry in my view.

The spread of philosophy across the blogosphere has changed the possibilities of community (since geography is obliterated) but the ego problem remains unaffected ... Ridiculously, blogs are derided at conferences as being trivial or unrigorous in some way yet their impact cannot be easily disregarded. This is something that will no doubt decay over time and we can have our academy and our solitude at once.

Brent Vizeau: First off, thank you for taking the time to have this conversation. I want to begin by asking, where does philosophy begin? I will preface this by making clear that I don’t mean with Thales or the “Greek miracle”. Rather, I mean to ask about the motivation for doing philosophy at all, and for taking the approach/perspective that you do? I want this to be able to go a number of ways, so I will suggest a few ideas to help hone in on the sort of place I think this question could go.

It is often thought that philosophy begins in “wonder” or curiosity. Simon Critchley argues, instead, that it begins in disappointment. It has been pointed out to me that philosophers like Hegel have “one great obsession” that colors their whole approach. Do you think that there is this kind of pre-philosophical element at the beginning of philosophy? If so, what gets you going? What is your experience of first moments/motivations?

Ben Woodard: The two terms you mention – wonder and disappointment both seem to place philosophy in relation to enchantment which I think is a fairly common relation. Since the widespread turn away from metaphysics, I think that continental philosophy has become too concerned with re-enchanting the world for humans against the overblown demons of science and technology. At the same time philosophy is always about us (as the only beings we know of capable of philosophizing) at least to the degree that our own pathologies drive where are particular interests go. So while our own lives as a series of accidents clearly forms our own intellectual obsessions it does not, nor should it, decide the broader contours of philosophy for us either personally or collectively. 

Since philosophy is at its base thinking about thinking, the motivation for pursuing philosophy can be any reaction (whether anger, frustration, confusion, etc) regarding the formation and ramifications of different kinds of thinking. Furthermore, I think philosophy, at its most interesting, is an attempt to populate the noosphere (or whatever you want to call it) with new engines for producing thoughts.

Personally the motivation for me was confusion, confusion in the face of large entities whether economic, socio-cultural, historical etc. that didn't make sense when you weighed their power/influence against their likely origins. For me philosophy was a way to approach the question of what goes on in peoples heads to make x, y, and z happen especially when these actions fly in the face of any sort of realism. Basically my personal reason for doing philosophy is the question “Why is realism so difficult and so opposed?”

Reflections on Philosophy

As I said when I made the initial announcement, I’ve conducted a series of somewhat informal interviews with graduate students. The interviews are intended to be an investigation of the goals and motivations of philosophy students, as well as a way into a discussion about how we see our jobs as philosophers/students of philosophy and what we’d like to get out of this life.

Below are posted four interviews. I’ve posted them in the order in which they were completed (read from this introduction downward), but chose to post them all together so that they can be read with and against one another.

I’ve ‘lightly’ edited them, mostly to break up long paragraphs to make the responses more blog-friendly. You’ll also notice that I’ve chosen to preface each interview with a couple quotes that stood out to me. I should note that these quotations were my choosing, and I apologize to anyone who would have preferred me highlight different passages.

With that said, I encourage readers to comment on these interviews and to feel free to engage with respondents and other commenters. But, please keep in mind that much of what is discussed in these interviews is quite personal, and to a large degree, they are ideas that aren’t fully worked out. With that in mind, I hope that engagements will remain in the spirit of charitable inquiry.

Reflections on Philosophy:Michael F. Interview

“I believe that philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom, wisdom being defined as the knowledge of the ultimate causes of things, the better for the pursuit of contemplation. It is sufficient for a philosopher to learn for themselves, and thus I am willing to extend the title "Philosopher" to non-academics, provided they display the requisite seriousness.”

 “I think that the intellectual isolation of philosophers is a side effect of the nature of philosophy. When you teach someone to philosophize, so I believe, you are teaching them to engage in an activity worthwhile for itself, and one without a further aim beyond its own enrichment.”

Brent Vizeau: First off, thank you for taking the time to have this conversation. I want to begin by asking simply, where does philosophy begin? I will preface this by making clear that I don’t mean with Thales or the Greek Miracle. Rather, I mean to ask about the motivation for doing philosophy at all, and for taking the approach/perspective that you do? I want this to be able to go a number of ways, so I will suggest a few ideas to help hone in on the sort of place I think this question could go.

It is often thought that philosophy begins in “wonder” or curiosity. Simon Critchley argues that it begins in disappointment. It has been pointed out to me that Hegel thought that philosophers have “one great obsession” that colors their whole approach. Do you think that there is this kind of pre-philosophical element at the beginning of philosophy? If so, what gets you going? What is your experience of first moments/motivations?

Michael F: I think there is a pre-philosophical element at the beginning of philosophy, one that may happen to almost everyone, but which can be either encouraged or stifled. Whatever it is, it happens much more strongly to some people than to others. Curiosity and wonder are not the right terms to describe it. Curiosity can be sated by an explanation of the phenomenon in question (Q: What are clouds made of? A: Water vapour condensed around dust particles which then clump together). Wonder is a mute state of appreciation, an aesthetic attitude towards being more appropriate to a religious mystic or an artist than to a philosopher. Wonder, for me, has never brought with the question "Why?"

My personal pre-philosophical beginning is one that remains with me still - it is a recurrent sense of uncanniness, of the world seeming strange and contingent. It raises the question "Why?" in its most ultimate sense. Why is there something rather than nothing, why this something rather than other possible somethings, and how is it possible for parts of this something to reflect upon both themselves and the whole? The thought this leaves me with is that there must be a systematic answer interlinking everything.

The second element that follows up this pre-philosophical beginning is the experience of contemplation. Contemplation complements the uncanniness, since it is the activity that most feels like it is answering the questions raised by the uncanny state. When I am thinking particularly hard about a problem my thoughts become quicksilver and fluid, but also highly structured. Ideas spin off from ideas and link together, forming larger and larger wholes. This state is engrossing and all consuming, and I can lose track of myself and my surroundings for hours. While the state is productive, it is also an example of what Aristotle calls (Nicomachean Ethics 1) a complete state, one that is done for itself. I don't want the contemplation to end, and am glad that the questions I am asking seem eternally capable of greater refinement and elaboration, so contemplation need never end.

This also explains why I think that explaining philosophy as beginning in disappointment does not capture why I do philosophy. Disappointment is a Pragmatists answer to why we do philosophy, as it is their answer to why thinking occurs. Thinking, for them, is an activity done in order that we may cease thinking. It is caused by problems and seeks their solutions. I do not consider my questions to be problems; they are opportunities.

Reflections on Philosophy: Paul Ennis Interview

“I would say that everyone should approach the tradition in two ways: one path should be straight-forward and probably pretty mundane. The other should be sporadic, and a little more intuitive. The combination tends to be effective and helps satisfy the twin demands of any good philosophy writing: rigor and originality.”

“Regarding what we ‘ought’ to be doing, well I don’t think it is my place to prescribe any kind of ‘ought’ to other people since this is not my area whatsoever. I suppose my ideal ‘ought’ would be something like staying true to that fundamental impulse to inquiry no matter the cost.”

Brent Vizeau: First off, thank you for taking the time to have this conversation. I want to begin by asking, where does philosophy begin? I will preface this by making clear that I don’t mean with Thales or the “Greek miracle”. Rather, I mean to ask about the motivation for doing philosophy at all, and for taking the approach/perspective that you do? I want this to be able to go a number of ways, so I will suggest a few ideas to help hone in on the sort of place I think this question could go.

It is often thought that philosophy begins in “wonder” or curiosity. Simon Critchley argues, instead, that it begins in disappointment. It has been pointed out to me that philosophers like Hegel have “one great obsession” that colors their whole approach. Do you think that there is this kind of pre-philosophical element at the beginning of philosophy? If so, what gets you going? What is your experience of first moments/motivations?

Paul Ennis: I really don’t know how to answer this question because I have never answered it for myself. I have no idea why I do philosophy though I do have a response to the (oft-asked) question of what philosophy is or does: philosophy is to ‘know why you believe what you believe.’ I suppose my base motivation for pursuing philosophy is that I really do want to know why I look at the world the way I do.

Certainly I don’t have ‘one great problem’ like Hegel or Heidegger had. I am jealous that they knew so early what they were trying to figure out. There is a whole series of problems that I want to solve but the answers seem to sprawl out across all kinds of disciplines. But I do take these ‘events’ of philosophy seriously. Even though the ‘Greek beginning’ has been hugely compromised and even the Enlightenment has come under attack for its quasi-theological approach (which Hegel had already accused it of in the Phenomenology) I still consider these fundamentally positive interventions into the history of thinking. That would be my shotgun answer but the core of philosophy for me is something entirely different.

It is a prolonged investigation of fringe, albeit rational, problems such as, but the possible examples are legion, the emergence of transcendental subjectivity. You have to be a peculiar sort to take this as a guiding theme for your life’s work, but once you become familiar with the force of the historical meditation on these kinds of problems it is difficult to extricate yourself from it. So I’m not sure it is a simple case of being motivated to answer certain problems prior to reading philosophy and then working that problem out in dialogue with the great thinkers.

Rather it is a kind of slow accretion where you don’t have a problem to sort out but then through reading great thinkers you become convinced that these problems matter. Then the latent ideas that you would normally have pushed aside start to bubble to the surface and you learn to take them seriously. So I don’t think there is a pre-philosophical impetus – more like a post-philosophical impetus if that is possible! Of course the philosopher can’t help but ask what is possible.

Reflections on Philosophy: J. Glass Interview

"You can't pick a set of rules for inquiry and systematically exhaust those alone because the rules themselves will go unchallenged.”

“I actually think that ideally a philosopher, in so far as he inquires, seeks only to live up to his own expectations and answer his own personal questions--he has to cater to his own interests and passions because only thereby will he do worthwhile work; but ideally his inquiry can be made available to others and be useful to them after the fact.”

“It's important to be discerning and not attempt to read loads of books just for the sake of exhibiting one's erudition; but it's important to do oneself the justice of becoming familiar with approaches taken by others to similar problems.”

Brent Vizeau: First off, thank you for taking the time to have this conversation. I want to begin by asking simply, where does philosophy begin? I will preface this by making clear that I don’t mean with Thales or the Greek Miracle. Rather, I mean to ask about the motivation for doing philosophy at all, and for taking the approach/perspective that you do? I want this to be able to go a number of ways, so I will suggest a few ideas to help hone in on the sort of place I think this question could go.

It is often thought that philosophy begins in “wonder” or curiosity. Simon Critchley argues that it begins in disappointment. It has been pointed out to me that Hegel had “one great obsession” that colored his whole approach. Do you think that there is this kind of pre-philosophical element at the beginning of philosophy? If so, what gets you going? What is your experience of first moments/motivations? 

J. Glass: The embarrassing answer as to why I got into philosophy--which I'd appreciate you keeping to yourself lest my emo image around the department get further out of hand--is... When I was a kid I was overly afraid of death and thought about it constantly. I didn't know what I wanted to do with my life and there seemed to be a lot of pressure to do it right--since I was so obsessed with not dying for nothing. Everything practical seemed trivial on a sort of cosmic scale. Philosophy seemed to be the most promising in that it might allow me insight into life and a life-path.

When I started I was really into philosophy of space and time because it seemed like that could really reveal the secrets of the universe--I was a bit of a positivist. And then I realized that that wouldn't do and some metaphysics--further than space and time--was needed. And then I figured that personal identity would solve my problems: if I knew what exactly a person was--i.e., what I am--then I could figure out what my existential issues were and what I should be doing. If one could know exactly what a person is, one could know exactly what a person should do.

And then finally I figured that the problem was in the 'should' and value seemed to stand at the bottom of all my problems--including my previous fear of death, which had in the meantime mostly been shirked due to my busyness with school and wanting to get a job as a professor eventually.

So all of my philosophical endeavours have been a really selfish, sometimes-government-funded quest to sort out my own existential crises. And even my current research isn't really an exception.

Reflections on Philosophy: David Pitcher Interview

“The philosopher is the one who considers wonder's lack of linguistic expression a deficiency or form of ignorance, and is pressed to render this experience in language, so that it might be understood, communicated, and related to concepts and other truths. Philosophy, then, begins in wonder and ends in ponder.” 

“Philosophers are not merely clerics of language and servants to concepts - they must always be capable of returning to the source of signification, and guiding others to return to the same source. A good work, then, would, out of these deep and tortuous clouds of symbols, fulgurate down to the ground like a lightning strike, and make the world shine brilliantly for a scattered audience, if only for a moment.”

Brent Vizeau: First off, thank you for taking the time to have this conversation. I want to begin by asking, where does philosophy begin? I will preface this by making clear that I don’t mean with Thales or the “Greek miracle”. Rather, I mean to ask about the motivation for doing philosophy at all, and for taking the approach/perspective that you do? I want this to be able to go a number of ways, so I will suggest a few ideas to help hone in on the sort of place I think this question could go.

It is often thought that philosophy begins in “wonder” or curiosity. Simon Critchley argues, instead, that it begins in disappointment. It has been pointed out to me that philosophers like Hegel have “one great obsession” that colors their whole approach. Do you think that there is this kind of pre-philosophical element at the beginning of philosophy? If so, what gets you going? What is your experience of first moments/motivations?

David Pitcher: I agree with Plato that "philosophy begins in wonder." On my understanding of the initial moments of moving from practical life to theoretical life, one is confronted with an object (concrete or abstract) from which a truth or meaning is derived, channeled or experienced, but only in an inchoate, "felt" form. It is merely sensed, perceived, but not made explicit or coherent. Some folks may prefer to leave it at mere marvelousness (as in aesthetic enjoyment), and some may declare it a revelation or an oceanic feeling (as in "religious" experience).

Psychologists invoke it as catharsis and scientists call it serendipity. Poets may refer to a moment of acute awareness and problem-solvers exclaim that it is insight, inspiration or intuition. The philosopher is the one who considers wonder's lack of linguistic expression a deficiency or form of ignorance, and is pressed to render this experience in language, so that it might be understood, communicated, and related to concepts and other truths. Philosophy, then, begins in wonder and ends in ponder.

It follows from this emphasis of wonder that wonder is a necessary condition but not sufficient condition for the spawning of sophistry. This is the point at which discussions of curiosity and disappointment emerge - philosophers seem to have some kind of need for explication and a demand for elucidation. It may seem that I am begging the question by defining a motive in terms of a need, but the idea is that regardless of this need, wonder is the starting point. Human motivation is far too varied, obscure and irregular to consider any particular motive essential to any behavior, including philosophizing.

For example, one might be tacitly guided by her father's love for eloquent expressions, leading her to desire paternal recognition by mediating wonder with ponder. Another may succumb to bitterness and paranoia to the extent that, out of his hallucinatory psychosis, he creates a fantasy world that is masked by its sole tie to reality, viz. an indubitable fundamental truth. A vengeful yet cowardly individual may be dissatisfied with a priest's dogma, and channel his frustrated anguish into emotionally expressing his profound experiences.

So, there are a whole breadth of complex motives, many of which we are unaware, that lead us to our passionate search for truth. Nevertheless, if we are considering the utter beginning of philosophy, then it must be said that the first moment is wonder, and that other moments (grounded in myriad motivations) mediate the transition to ponder.

The Graduate Student Experience

I had never seen this video before, though I think many others have. If you're a grad student, then this should resonate well with you.

If we were to wait until we had read all the relevant precedents of any given philosopher that we happen to be interested in, then we would never get off the ground. Well, we might get off the ground, but there is certainly no way we'd ever catch up to our interest.

Quick note on Bataille and Baudrillard

I tend to read Baudrillard's "Hyperreality" in the strong sense; that is, that our reality is a state of total simulation. I don't necessarily think that this is true, but that it is the most fruitful way to take in Baudrillard's insights. Anyway, I had this idea related to "reversibility" as discussed in an earlier post. This little thought that I wanted not to forget was something like, "if our reality resists a reversal from Real to Hyperreal, then it is probably because totality of simulation is staved off by an efficient 'expenditure without return' in Bataille's sense". My recollection of Bataille is somewhat spotty, so don't hold it against me.

Bataille talks about systems with a finite growth threshold and an infinite, or excessive, means for growth. The earth is such a system, with the sun providing an energy source that outstrips the earths capacity to house the production predicated on this energy. Other examples are the capitalist economy, symbolic economies of all kinds, and so on. One way or another the system will "blow off some steam", either catastrophically when the capacity is reached, or strategically (though this need not be conscious) through expenditure without return. War, sacrifice, and even luxury are examples of ways to let off some of the pressure.

We throw money into Bentley's and jewels and whatnot in order, among other reasons, to stave off catastrophe. This is our expenditure without return. We're damn good at it too. This would be one reason why ours is not a hyper-reality, if in fact it is not: we're good at avoiding the limit points of systems of which we are a part. There is no reason to believe that ideological systems should be any different, though a more in-depth analysis ought to be undertaken for this to me more than a passing connection of ideas.

ADDENDUM: An example of sacrifice in our culture today.

Speculations, and other SR Artifacts

In support of my wager that Speculative Realism is for real, and for those who might be interested, here are a few of the new and forthcoming artifacts of SR:

"Speculations" the journal of Speculative Realism has just released it's first issue. Befitting the ideology of community this field seems to embrace, it is available in electronic form for free, or in paper form for a very reasonable price. I suspect that this journal may end up being more representative, if not of SR in general, then of the branches of SR that I most enjoy (the Object-Oriented side) than the journal Collapse - but this is pure speculation on my part. I should also note that the early issues of this journal are very important works in the development of SR. 

Contrary to what is posted at Perverse Egalitarianism, there is a strong presence of Graham Harman, at least in this issue of the Journal. I find this quite welcome, as I'm not among the haters, and from what I can tell, the object-oriented faction of SR has the most to offer me. 

Also, there are two forthcoming collections of SR works: The Speculative Turn (coming shortly), and an Anthology of Object-Oriented Philosophy (coming slightly further down the road, with, I would assume, a more interesting title than what I've attributed to it here). 

Levy Bryant's The Democracy of Objects is fully written, and awaiting the usual editorial treatment before printing. I'm among the lucky who've been allowed to review this text in advance, and it is the clearest and most direct statement of a position in SR that I've come across thus far. I suspect that as the field takes hold, others will deliver their "systems" (if we can call them that) in a likewise fashion.

Lastly, and I'm sure I've missed something relevant, Graham Harman has posted brief updates about his current book project on the work of fellow SR traveller, Quentin Meillasoux, here and here. 

Revelations of an MA degree

Now just days from my MA thesis defence, I'm taking a bit of time to think back over my time in this program. Where was I when I began? and where am I now? Here are the biggest changes:

1) Badiou, obviously. I had only heard the name a few times, and saw the book at the store a few times. In fact, I recall picking up Being and Event for the first time and enjoying a certain aesthetic quality it has. Books sometimes just feel right in your hands. Upon opening the book and reading a few pages at random, I found an incomprehensible mush of mathematical symbols and references I couldn't possibly follow. That was then! Desiring to read more contemporary continental political theory, I approached a new, young professor who's areas of expertise are Derrida, Nancy, Heidegger, etc... and asked her if she had time for a reading course. Of course, the kind soul she is, she made time for me, and my life will literally never be the same.

We discussed a few names briefly, and she suggested Badiou and Ranciere, thinkers she was not well acquainted with, but would like to be. So we read Badiou. Over the course of about five months, I read nearly everything available in English and set my sights on writing a thesis on Badiou's political ontology. It turns out that this is what I've done. I will forever have this strong Badiouian influence to draw on.

2) Something that strikes me as significant, was that I went from being a student who'd read some Kant, and toiled in misunderstanding, to one who is actually reasonably fluent in Kantianese. In the process, I've come all the way from having a strong distaste colored by curiosity (a kind of curious masochism that philosophers are often stricken with) to considering Kant one of my main points of philosophical orientation. I have a great fondness now for Kant, though I disagree with nearly everything he says. Kant is an odd figure. Much like Hegel, I think he is fantastically wrong about nearly everything, and yet he is incredibly useful to understand. So, along with Badiou, I officially added Kant to my intellectual arsenal.

3) The next most significant thing I think that has happened is that I am now much more refective upon the ways I work, and the kind of relationships I want to and within philosophy. I used to go to class, read the book and write a paper. I've always read a great deal more than required for class, mostly because I have a penchant for very current and sexy philosophy. But now more than ever I think about my approach to my job, I write, I take on projects and I consciously try to build a network of allies. The desire for a community is greater now than it ever has been for me.

I can't help but to think that this comes largely from three places: an excellent, though small, group of grad students who joined the program this past year, with whom I share little in common intellectually, but with whom I always have great conversations; from my exceptionally supportive supervisor, who's showed me a more personable and enjoyable way to interact with others in the academy (her genuine concern for others has rubbed off me thinks); and from my partner who's had to deal with so much bureaucratic nonsense, harsh departmental in-fighting and gossip, and a generally inhospitable and unfortunate climate to work in - her experience has been a great example for the kind I hope never to have or to contribute to myself.

There are many more things that I will take away from this program, but these are three things that strike me most immediately upon reflection. Perhaps there will be a significant addendum or two as I reflect further.

Badiou’s Politics, Nihilism, and a Solution!

As I have my MA thesis defence next week, I thought it would be good to post a short outline of what I discuss therein. Of course, along the way, I develop a Badiouian theory of historical change, a humanist anthropology that demarcates the political sphere from others, and all kinds of other lines of inquiry. Here is just the main idea that inspired the thesis from the start. This will be old hat for those who’ve attended my talks on this topic.

For Badiou, what is, strictly speaking, is a multiplicity of multiplicities, cashed out in terms of set theory. There are sets within sets within sets, all the way, with one exception: the null set, or the void. Every well-founded set contains the empty set as an element. The situations in which we exist are this sort of set. So, in every socio-historical situation, there will be some part (sub-set) whose elements do not belong to the situation. This is the void of the situation, much like the null-set element in any founded set.

Badiou has a famous conception of the “event”, as a rupture with the situation. This rupture or break from the structure of this situation out of which it arises can occur because of this part that escapes the count/structure of the situation. Since there is a kind of “outside” within each situation, there is a latent possibility of an event. When something happens on the edge of the void, someone or ones (political subjectivity is/can be collective) may be hailed to decide upon the significance of the event. When a protest erupts, seemingly out of nowhere, a witness, either within or without, must “decide” upon the significance of the event.

This decision is either an interpretation according to the means of understanding available from within the situation, in which case it will not have been an event; or, the decision will be a declaration without concept of the evental significance of the happening. The former might be to think or say, “this is just another protest like all the rest.” The latter would be to give the happening a name, and commit oneself to tracing out the consequences of its truth in and through making true this declaration.

A potential political actor has two options for genuine political engagement: either one happens across what will have been an event in the making, or one enters into an already open procedure of truth (the procedure of tracing out the consequences of the evental decision). But, since Badiou’s presentation seems to intentionally lead the reader to believe that events are incredibly rare, his examples number five in over two hundred years, there are few opportunities for engagement of the first sort. This leaves the possibility of entering into an already open procedure of truth, which is equally unlikely for some, especially young, potential political actors.

Let Us Think: Reading "First as Tragedy, Then as Farce"

This is an old post (Nov 2009) of mine from a different blog, but I like the passage so much I thought I would share it again.

Zizek's most recent effort is welcomed by this peripatetic with open arms and eyes glued to the pages as I bump into strangers all over campus. Our dear old Slovenian wordsmith has always had a knack for grabbing and holding the reader's attention, only with this effort, as with his earlier writings, when I stop reading, I can recall and explain the point of what I just read. No, Zizek hasn't stopped theorizing through innumerable examples and rhetorical flourishes that some of us find distracting, albeit entertaining. 

In First as Tragedy, then as Farce, Zizek uses his familiar methods to discuss and deliver his message in all of the detail and nuance they deserve. This takes considerable effort, and many, many examples to think through. Only, in this work, all of the twists and turns seem to help his cause. Instead of talking continuously so as not to cease existing - a worry he expresses in Astra Taylor's film Zizek! - he seems genuinely impassioned. For someone wandering around the left wing with a vague sense that something needs to be done, having his genius directed toward something he seems to care so much about should prove useful, if not comforting.

For my money, and I'm not finished reading (only 20-ish pages to go!), the value of First as Tragedy for political thinking lies both in the general message that Zizek is laying out, and in the many analyses of our present situation that he offers. I want to comment only on the former at this time. His program is distinctly Communist in character, but not a naive return to a critique of the contradictions of our historical situation - which is not to say that such a critique cannot be performed.

Instead, Zizek highlights the imperative to think through the idea of Communism, an idea we must hold onto in the face of a hollowed out Democracy that applies to any and all situations. Communism, as an idea, is itself something we have to make sense of in light of our current historical situation, and not something we apply to the situation in order to make sense of the latter. The failing of the left is that even in a world where the whole political spectrum knows that something is wrong, the left, the alternative, has no clear picture of what to do in place of the status quo.

This diagnosis leaves us in a position where we want to act (that is, some of you want to act), but don't know what to do. By default, the liberal hegemony continues. This is why Zizek offers my favorite of his recent injunctions: we need to stop and think.

With incredible frequency, Politicians deliver promises that are never fulfilled through action. Granted. But, on the contrary, those politicians also act all too often without thinking. The current financial crisis is the result of something, yet instead of figuring out what and why, the governments of the global powers act - perhaps in response the their jerking knees - by throwing $700 Billion (in the US alone) at the problem, as though this will save the sinking ship.

Likewise, activists of all stripes gather in futile efforts that serve their egos and self-images more than any 'cause' which they feign to represent. Perhaps this may be overly cynical, but those activists, those young people, do little more than practice being political, even when they have good intensions. My wager is that this is because they have a confused mix of tired messages and newly born angst, but little if any thought (maybe they are lacking a procedure of truth?) guiding their efforts.

Zizek reminds us that in lieu of a well thought out program of action, and in lieu of an alternative vision of life to the one that "ended history", we ought to slow down, regroup, figure out what it means to be the left, the communists, of today, and then proceed. As a philosopher, this injunction to think is the sweetest music I've heard in a while. I'd like to suggest that we need to think about what kind of event could, and what it would mean for that event to, symbolically 'un-end' history.

Reflections on Philosophy

I will be posting a series of interviews I am conducting rather informally with some graduate students of philosophy. I'm mostly interested in having a kind of reflective discussion about philosophy as a practice and how we see our jobs, motivations, goals, communities and so on.

A lot is taken for granted in this regard, and I think it will be useful to make explicit and discuss what we do in this field. I'm not sure exactly what we will get out of this, but I hope it is a way-in to further discussions about philosophy in general, and maybe even some discussions that are specifically philosophical in nature. 

I am conducting the interviews by e-mail and somewhat concurrently, so I will post them in the order that I complete them.

Addendum: I should add that if anyone else wants to be so interviewed, e-mail me and we can discuss it: major.philosophy[at]gmail.com

Let's Not be Too Hasty...

...it is after all a time honored tradition!

From the New York Times (excerpts):

BEIJING — The Chinese government has called for an end to the public shaming of criminal suspects, a time-honored cudgel of Chinese law enforcement but one that has increasingly rattled the public.

The new regulations are thought to be a response to the public outcry over a recent spate of “shame parades,” in which those suspected of being prostitutes are shackled and forced to walk in public.

Last October, the police in Henan Province took to the Internet, posting photographs of women suspected of being prostitutes. Other cities have taken to publishing the names and addresses of convicted sex workers and those of their clients. The most widely circulated images, taken earlier this month in the southern city of Dongguan, included young women roped together and paraded barefoot through crowded city streets.

The police later said they were not punishing the women, only seeking their help in the pursuit of an investigation.

Public shaming of the accused and the condemned has been a long tradition in China — one that the Communist Party embraced with zeal during episodes of class struggle and anticrime crusades. Although public executions have been discontinued, provincial cities still hold mass sentencing rallies, during which convicts wearing confessional placards are driven though the streets in open trucks.

Too Anarchist, or Not Too Anarchist?

This is an old post (Nov 2009) of mine from a different blog, but I like the passage so much I thought I would share it again. It was pretty popular with at least one reader. (I added some schnazzy pics to spice it up.)

In my current theoretical space, I am a Badiouian (and for some reason this particular adjectival form makes me smile each time I say, er, type it). As such, I ought to be open, in some sense, to the idea of “spontaneous self-organization”, which is the preferred form of organization by many in the left today. This organizational method or practice is overtly anarchistic and seems to be the main alternative to the old ideas about grassroots organizing, building committees of resistance that intervene locally but share an ideology and sense of purpose with other local bodies, eventually linking up or coming together under one party banner – a unified front – to take their interventions to the big stage, and so on.

I suggest that I ought to find this idea of spontaneous self-organization appealing, since, for Badiou, and according to my modified Badiouian political framework, politics is inaugurated in an aleatory event. We cannot predict or force an event, so, in some sense, we organize in and through our becoming subject to the new procedure of truth. Our coming together into a collective subjectivity in response to an unpredictable event sounds a lot like spontaneous self-organization. Our fidelity compels us to materially trace out the consequences of our commitment, that is, in the good old-fashioned Marxist, (Hegelian even) sense of getting your hands dirty and changing the world according to your will – or in this case, according to the truth you’ve wagered on. This seems like something that those who favor the idea of spontaneous self-organization would like: become political when you are struck by something important that calls for engagement. Engage in ways that make sense to you, indifferent to there being a movement or front. The picture all kind of comes together.

Why then do I not find this idea about organization appealing? Well, I just don’t see it as something I can have confidence in. It seems to me that global capitalism, or whatever name we might give to “the system”, is going to have to change. For many reasons – take your pick – the system will be forced to transform radically. This is somewhat contentious; but, taking it for granted, we have the choice to let forces other than our own efforts steer the change, or we can change it according to our will. Perhaps this is my call to action or something.

If you experience, morally, existentially, or otherwise, the imperative to act in the face of this supposed change, then you need ask yourself: can I rely upon spontaneous self-organization of the left to steer the transformation? I’d not bet on it. It seems to me a matter of confidence that the left work hard to find ways of organizing that allow some measure of control, and that allows political actors to gauge the discontent of the masses, the effects of disaster ideologies on people – that is, how effective are the enemies at hijacking public opinion? (and how effective are we at it for that matter?) – and an organization that allows strong and strategic intervention. Of course, if individuals or groups spontaneously act in solidarity with the organized movement or front, then all the better, it just seems to me that the masses will need a sympathetic nudge.

I suppose the point, in a round about way, is that confidence plays an important role in the evaluation of political theories, and I have more confidence in something like Lenin’s vanguardism than the many versions of anarchism circulating today. Works like The Coming Insurrection, by the Invisible Committee, just don’t inspire confidence (although I welcome suggestions about other anarchisms that might do so).

Against Modesty, or "Why is Careerism Such a Dirty Word?"

First, I'm obviously not against modesty in any absolute sense. What I am against is the idea that those in the academy ought to be apologetic for their successes and the things they know, and how some very successful, very keen thinkers manage to travel the halls of their institutions without their students knowing just how big they are.

One of the best things that grad students can do is to model the behaviour of professors who they find interesting, productive, kind, supportive and so on. Figure out how those you look up to do it, and take advantage of the things they've learned through their own sweat and tears. Everyone with jobs in the academy are intelligent people. But some are exceptionally so, and some are exceptionally well-organized, disciplined, and so on. Some thinkers leave their mark on a field and cast a long shadow. These people have secrets that others don't. If they are too modest, then many students miss out on the chance to pick their brains.

Now, people will respond that students shouldn't merely go star gazing. The less popular, but still highly intelligent professors of the academy still have much to offer, and possibly more since their time is likely more their own. Success brings a lot of responsibility in terms of speaking engagements, books, articles, and so on. Some big shots are lousy supervisors. But some aren't! Those modest giants who seamlessly navigate the corridors of their schools, blending into the masses, are likely also ones who seem kind, supportive and so on. Combine that with their place in their field, and you have on your hands a great learning opportunity.

So professors, if you are hot shots, don't keep it to yourself. Be a hot shot, and show me the ropes!

I guess this goes for grad students as well. I hate the denigration that gets heaped upon ambitious students who work hard and produce presentable, publishable, works. We need more, not fewer, of these students. What we need less of are arrogant, vicious, and unsupportive students, as well as those who suck the energy from those who want to better themselves and their skills. There is a negative force at two poles: both those with too many excuses for their own ineptitude, who try to drag others down; and, those successful students who have the attitude that if you aren't on their level just now, then you are a loser.

I'd like to see more students taking seriously the careerist aspects of graduate school, while maintaining a positive, helpful, and cooperative attitude toward their peers. Seeing your name in print is a shot in the arm, which is well-deserved for surviving all the times you get rejected before you get there. Also, writing is what we do. Our ideas, as well-formed as they seem in our minds, are never as well-formed as they will be when we write them down to present to a public. We think through our writing, so more writing, is, in principle, more thinking. As a philosopher, this is a good thing.

One thing that I've come to realize is that writing begets writing. The more you give talks, publish papers, workshop, and so on, the more opportunities to do these things you will have. You make many connections in and through the activities that are a normal part of our jobs anyway. Someone will overhear the brilliant presentation you gave based on your thesis - work you have already put in - and invite you to write a chapter for their book. This really happens, and it's how some people manage to get so many publications. Journals accept an incredibly low percent of submissions (5-10%), so you will get rejected many more times than accepted. If you get invited to write or talk, then you circumvent that whole process. The lesson: write more, present more, so you can write more and present more and thus THINK more too.

I strive to achieve both the kind of attitude toward my peers that I described above and toward my work, though I am not particularly successful myself. Some of the things I do, that you can too, to be a better colleague are: make your work available to others, give them honest advice based on your own trials and pitfalls, and take their projects seriously when they have something serious to share. Build a community and you will reap the rewards.

Onticology: Some notes about objects

As mentioned previously, I'm reading through a draft manuscript of Levi Bryant's forthcoming

The Democracy of Objects. A little over fifty pages in, and I'm really enjoying the clarity of this text. For those of you interested in SR/OOO, there is almost too much information in the blogosphere to keep up with. To be sure, this is a good thing. If you want to follow up on these points or flesh out your own understanding, the best resource is the Speculative Realism Pathfinder. I encourage you to take a look, as this emerging field seems to be drawing people into its orbit at such a rate that it will surely take hold as more than a fad. In fact, established field have been incorporated into this broad area retroactively. Both actor-network theory and eliminative materialism are considered to fall under the umbrella of speculative realism.

At the heart of onticology, Bryant's particular version of object-oriented ontology, is a peculiar conception of objects. In some sense, the object takes the place of "substance" in classical metaphysics. I'll outline a few points about objects to give you a sense for what he thinks of them.

• Objects are not defined by their qualities (or occasions thereof, termed "events"), but by their "powers" or capacities. So, an object can be without it's qualities, but not without its powers.

• Likewise (for reasons too complicated to get into here, and to save something of the secret for those who get the book), objects are not defined by their external relations.

• Object relations come in two forms, internal or "endo-" and external or "exo-". The former comprise the structure of an object (much more will be said of this in the coming chapters me thinks), and the latter the relations objects enter into with other objects.

• Since objects have the power to created events in the world (keep in mind the notion of event mentioned above), objects apart from their qualities are called "difference engines", insofar as the production of an event makes a difference in the world. This looks like a trace of what used to be a central principle for Bryant, namely "the ontic principle", that he has since dropped: there is no difference that does not make a difference (which implied that objects were, in some sense, the difference they made in the world).

• He also introduces a very cool-sounding bit of terminology, that I'm not sure is necessary: "virtual proper being". Objects are not their qualities, yet they endure, the substantial portion (object apart from quality) is called virtual proper being. I here the word "monad" ringing somewhere in the distance here, if ever so softly. I'm looking forward to more on this concept.

• The term "quality" is dropped (though event is still maintained as synonym) in favor of "Local Manifestation". Events occur in a number of ways, always under particular conditions. So each event is a local manifestation. There is a cautionary note, however. Manifestations are not manifest to any subject. Instead they are "actualizations" in the world, witnessing subject or no.

• Since objects are at the core difference engines, whose qualities are events or manifestations, we should not say that the object "has" qualities, but rather "does" qualities.

• The picture of objects we are left with, where the core object and it's manifestations/qualities are separate but connected in some kind of endo-relation, is one of a split-object. The "core" or virtual proper being of an object is always, in some sense, withdrawn (to borrow the term from Graham Harman) behind its qualities, and thus withdrawn from other objects.

More to come as I read more from Bryant, but also from others in this field. On the suggestion of Graham Harman, I will be reading some Leibniz to better ground my understanding of classical metaphysics. That should make for a couple interesting posts!

Kant, and Fun with Counterfactual Hypotheticals

This is an old post (Dec 2009) of mine from a different blog, but I like the passage so much I thought I would share it again. If anyone reads this, maybe you will have a more interesting way to interpret it?

This excerpt is from a strange little section of Kant's Second Critique called "On the Wise Adaptation of the Human Being’s Cognitive Faculties to His Practical Vocation". He is imagining what it would be like if could somehow peer into the noumenal realm:

Instead of the conflict that the moral disposition now has to carry on with the inclinations, in which, through after some defeats, moral strength of soul is to be gradually acquired, God and eternity with their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes…[H]ence most actions conforming to the law would be done from fear, only a few from hope, and none at all from duty, and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the world depends, would not exist at all. As long as human nature remains as it is, human conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism in which, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but there would be no life in the figures.

The phenomenal realm is law-governed, and, as such, our freedom is not found in this realm. If we could see into the noumenal (which we can't), there too we would not find the locus of our freedom. Instead, Zizek suggests that the interplay between the two is where our freedom is operative. I prefer to see the noumenal as the "Real" void of the phenomenal, an excess. Since moral worthiness is a matter of determining the will according to duty for duty's sake instead of determining the will according to inclination, something must account for this choice, and the freedom to make this choice ex nihilo. Since the noumenal realm, and god and the afterlife for that matter, is a necessary thought without positive (perhaps very minimal) content, then why not locate spontaneous freedom to self-determine the will on the side of the noumenal -- again as a necessary thought -- rather than the interplay Zizek prefers? I don't see what is gained from Zizek's take, other than that it fits nicely with his "parallax".

Reading Kant makes me happy.

I also added this gem to the comments on that blog post:

While we're talking Kant... I recall reading this joke from Kant's third Critique. (I grabbed it from wiki this time.) He says, "Laughter is an effect that arises if a tense expectation is transformed into nothing." Here is Kant's 219-year old joke and his analysis:

An Englishman at an Indian's table in Surat saw a bottle of ale being opened, and all the beer, turned to froth, rushed out. The Indian, by repeated exclamations, showed his great amazement. - Well, what's so amazing in that? asked the Englishman. - Oh, but I'm not amazed at its coming out, replied the Indian, but how you managed to get it all in. - This makes us laugh, and it gives us a hearty pleasure. This is not because, say, we think we are smarter than this ignorant man, nor are we laughing at anything else here that it is our liking and that we noticed through our understanding. It is rather that we had a tense expectation that suddenly vanished...

Kant really does make me happy!

Speculative Realism (SR) and Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO)

For those of you who know me, you'll know that I've had a spectator's interests in SR/OOO for some time. I've read Quentin Meillasoux's After Finitude, an excellent promissory text, where the central problematic of this field is defined (though a solution or alternative is only hinted at). I've also, obviously, read a small bit of Graham Harman's work in both Tool-Being and Guerilla Metaphysics. Harman's philosophy is built upon an extensive analysis of Heidegger's analysis of tools and the shift that takes place when they break down. From what I can tell, both of Harman's texts are of the highest quality, though Heideggerians are likely to get pissed off if they read him.

The other major coordinates of this emerging field are Iain Hamilton Grant, whose work I am wholly unfamiliar with (as I think there isn't all that much of it available) and Ray Brassier, whose text Nihil Unbound looks very interesting from what I have skimmed (it's something of a fundamentally nihilist scientism?). Apparently Brassier has a discussion of Badiou in there, though I didn't come across it myself. All of the main "coordinates" of this field, as I call them, are kinds of ontological realists (the position that we can know about objects as they exist independently of all traces of the human, and not a thesis about how we can know objects). I will come back to this.

There are, of course, other thinkers who've been very influential on this field either directly, in the case of Badiou on Meillasoux (the latter was a student of the former) and Latour on Harman, or indirectly in the case of Whitehead, the Ancients and Early-Moderns on everyone.

I would contend, from what I know of SR/OOO, that there is a fifth major coordinate to this field, though he is a little known philosopher - if a very well known blogger (to many hip continental leaning graduate students): Levi Bryant. He is the source of the term "Object-Oriented Ontology", and calls his own ontology "onticology". His version of OOO is what he calls a "flat ontology" in that:

there are [not] two worlds, the real natural world and the ideal mental world of meaning, but that there is only one level: reality. Onticology thus draws a transversal line across the distinction between mind and world, culture and nature. Culture is not other than reality or the real, but is an element of the real. Since onticology begins with the hypothesis, wishing to know where it will go, that there is no difference that does not make a difference, it proves impossible to exclude the human. Why? Because humans make a difference. What onticology objects to is not the thesis that humans are elements in the real, but the thesis that every relation is a human-world relation.

How badass does that sound? I'll tell you what, I've started reading the unpublished manuscript of his forthcoming The Democracy of Objects, and it is still just as intriguing.

The central problematic for all of the Speculative Realists is the problem of "correlationism" outlined by Meillasoux. He says,

by 'correlation' we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never either term considered apart from the other.

Perhaps the problem isn't as obvious as it would seem. Their concern is not strictly with mind/world relations. It is more general and pervasive. The problem is that all of our thinking of Being is thinking Being sutured to something of the human subject, whether is be mind, language, culture, or what have you. Further, the correlationist need not be an idealist. They don't deny the existence of a world apart from human subjectivity and all its traces. They simply think we cannot know things in themselves, and thus they turn every effort to know objects into a study of the study of objects (that is, a study of objects conditioned by human subjectivity). Shame on them!

Bryant draws on Foucault's concept of the 'episteme' to describe the bias away from ontology and toward epistemology that I often rant about. I've often said that everyone today begins with the epistemological question, in one form or another, ignoring the ontological. This is because correlationism has become a kind of "historical a priori" that defines the space in which we do philosophy. The realm in which we can disagree about anything is defined by certain things we must share in common, and take for granted. The Speculative Realists argue (convincingly) that this is a correlationist time and place.

Instead of thinking the being of objects sutured to human access, can we think the being of objects as such? These strange realists think so. I will post more about this as I read on.

Experiments in Ontology: Baudrillard and Hyperreality

One of Baudrillard’s key insights is that upon radicalization, every theory (or system) is subject to the form of reversibility. He is speaking specifically about systems of signification, but following the sentiments of his own methodology – that we take ideas to their extremes – can we not extend his notion of reversibility to other kinds of systems?

The idea is that taken to the extreme, any theory or system will fold back on itself. An interesting way to read the concept ‘hyperreality’ is as a kind of reversal from simulation to reality. A simulation is a copy of some real. As simulation reaches totality, as it covers over the real completely, there is nothing left but simulation. Simulation no longer has a basis in some real. With no remaining reality to support the simulation, it is completely detached, orbital, or ‘sovereign’. As the only “stuff” left, simulation becomes the “stuff” of reality, or reality itself. The system of simulation thus reverses itself at the limit point: what was a simulation of some real is now the real itself, the new real. Can we read this phenomenon more radically than does Baudrillard himself?

Sociologists, tired of the infectivity of language games, are trying to extend the use of postmodern theory into the realm of empirical research. Mirchandani (Sociological Theory, 23:1, 2005) and Cole, for example, think that Baudrillard and his postmodern colleagues have insights to offer that can shape the way we study the world around us. Might thinkers like Baudrillard also help us to think about the nature of reality as such? Over the next little while I’ll be working on outlining the contours of Baudrillard’s postmodernist epistemological ideas in order to then see how we might be able to apply something gleaned to our thinking about ontology: perhaps a sort of postmodern ontology. I guess the speculation would be that maybe Being as such is itself subject to instability, change, and ultimately a kind of structural reversal of the sort intended by the concept “hyperreality”. (Yes, Heideggerians, I probably have made an entity out of Being.) More on this point is sure to follow.

While on the topic of hyperreality: In Simulacra and Simulation, Baudrillard begins with a discussion of Borges’ fable of the map (“On Exactitude in Science”). The fable has it that a master cartographer creates a map of the land on a 1-to-1 scale, perfectly reproducing the land it maps. It is not exactly clear how we are to understand the fable in Baudrillard’s discussion of it. He says both that the map, as simulacrum, precedes the real land it maps; and, that the real does not survive its being covered over by the map. As usual, this is no matter of concern for us here. I think it is an interesting metaphor for the kind of ontology that might be suggested by the notion of hyperreality. The land covered over by the map will die and decay, and eventually become desert, so that the only real thing left is the map. Likewise, could it be that as simulation completes itself and covers over the real, the real doesn’t survive its total simulation and instead dies out, leaving only the simulation in its place?

If this has happened, if we live in hyperreality, could it be that to be is to be simulation? And if this is the case, post-reversal, would it matter? And would it any longer make sense to call our real a simulation?

The Conservatism of Protest Ideology

I had originally written up a much longer post about the recent G20 “crisis” in Toronto. Instead I’ll give you the most interesting point, and cut the chaff. There are two aspects to what I find interesting about the outrage people express toward the G20 security response. One aspect is that many innocent people were arrested and detained. Most of this sort of dimension of the problem rests on something like “punishment doesn’t fit the crime” logic. Fair enough in many cases. Though I think most people got "cool" war-stories out of it and suffered very little to get them. No matter, I will leave that issue for the time being. The other dimension of the outrage is something much less obvious.

People are very concerned with the ways in which their civil liberties have been compromised. The security force was either allowed to operate outside the law or to write the law on the fly. This flies in the face of juridico-legislative due process. The way the security response worked to shut down the protest denied many (approx. 900) their “right to protest”. It is around the loss of this right that there is so much fervor. But what is this right really? This sacred right to protest is all smoke and mirrors. Of course the police state will never wholly deny the right to protest, they want you to protest.

There is a common, and really quite genius, strategy of sterilizing threats by integrating them into the systems that they are designed to unsettle. I’ve recently been told that Noam Chomsky makes frequent reference to this phenomenon. MIT, an otherwise quite conservative institution, allows him to work there with all his radical leftist propaganda. They can’t really be that opposed to his politics if they allow him to give voice to his positions in their institution, can they? Well, his point is that one of the best ways to take the subversive edge off something like this, is to allow it, give it a home, and to do so in ways that are acceptable to the system. The police state allows protest because it is an ineffective and generally apolitical way to blow off steam without threatening real change.

For all those worried about your sacred right to protest, don’t be. It’s yours for as long as you want it. Of course, in order for the game to function, the police response has to be there. You have to feel like you are combating some oppressive regime for you to have the proper experience. This is as ideological as it comes. The police say, “no don’t protest, we’ll lock you up…lousy youth. Learn some manners, and pull up your pants!” This creates the space in which young people can feel political without being political.

Genuine politics doesn’t operate under the condition of being granted the right. It is never the case that the-powers-that-be give you the means (at least not on purpose) to compromise their power. You take it. You declare your right to effect change, and proceed according to your right. You act in such a way that the situation changes according to the right that directs your political intervention. The whole worry about them taking our right to protest away misses the entire point, which is exactly what prevents any really politics from taking place.

Zizek gives an excellent and very accessible discussion of ideology that I think may be helpful for interpreting the G20 and its aftermath. (His point about the “self-mockery” of pornography [35 min in] is exactly the kind of play I had suggested goes on in much of the cheesy MTV programming, though I didn’t really say anything about censorship in and through this play.)

A few final notes about politics:

I don’t have perfectly clear theory of political change, but I do have certain intuitions. Some of which (I had originally planned to discuss) are:

1) Politics operates at a distance from the state. You don’t effect radical change by following the rules.

2) Insofar as it is political, it must be radically so. Politics is not a negotiation of interests, but the bringing into being of a radically new structure/situation.

3) Spontaneous organization is a pipe dream. The new anarchisms that envision a cooperative but anarchically coordinated mass movement is about as passive as awaiting the second coming, and a kind of bad faith excuse. Radical politics must be undertaken by a subjectivity at least loosely organized around some kind of centre. My speculation is that this has to be some kind of charismatic leadership.

4) Radical change must occur in response to a kind of break or gap in the structure/logic of the situation. Also, although we cannot simply will into being a political event, we can exploit openings when they are presented. The degree to which we can create openings is still somewhat fuzzy to me. This is a point very much worth exploring.

I suppose this all makes me some kind of revolutionary vanguardist. So be it. I don’t see another way to bring about the kind of break necessary for real change. As suggested, I haven’t a very clear or detailed political program, but these are my intuitions about politics. If you see a lot of Badiou in these points, it is because I’ve been submerged in his works for well over a year. As I go forward with other thinkers, I will continue to flush out these insights.